The method o f hilling uscrs for niohilc tclcphony is hascd on systems dcvclopcd over time for fixed networks. We survey the technoloby involved, and argtic that these systems will hcconic increasingly inadequate for large populations of niohilc users whcrc frequent roaming is involved. Wc prcscnt two micropaymcnt schemes which permit ;I callcr t o inject ;I payment stream into the network which allows multiplc network operators and value-addcd scrvicc providers to be paid in real time. The methods support dynamic pricing by the association o f a pricing contract with the call wliicli specifics the cost for each k g o f the call route. The systcm will alleviate prohlcnis o f mohilc fraud, cliniinatc the nccd for intcropcrator hilling agrccmciits, and simplify payment for value-addcd network services. We discuss the rclativc merits o f the two systcms described and the c l i~~r a c t c r i~t i c~ o f the prototype implcnicntation.
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. %..'.. . ' 11 tlic fixed network, c u stomers have an enduring rclationship with their network operator. Payment takes place after services are used, and the fact that a particular local loop is involved means that additional c u s t o m e r a u t h e n t i c a t i o n is unnecessary. O n c e t h e u s e r becomes mobile, many additional problems come into play. Operators of current mobile networks havc had to face this problem, and have responded using billing schemes based largely on extensions to existing fixed network billing systems.
Cellular network fraud has become a major problem, and efforts to curb the extent of this fraud have led to the imposition of service restrictions on users, particularly in regard to roaming. In the future, when the number of mobile users of either ccllular networks or pcrsonal mobility services exceed the number of fixed users, the existing approach to billing will not be sufficient.
In this article we outline a rcal-time payment scheme that allows users of mobile communications serviccs to arrive in a new network, and avail thcmselves of network service using real-time paymcnt to both the primary network operator and any other scrvicc providers that may be involved in the call.
Existing Approaches to Billing
T h e practice of recording the details of individual calls for billing purposes h a s been in use since the commercial deploymcnt of early manual telephone exchanges in the late 19th century. In those times crtll detail record (CDR) information for long distance calls was collected and rccordcd by cordboard operators at the cxchange [ 11. The operator manually wrote the details onto a specially formatted record called a toll ticket. Thcsc tickets were later sent to a clcaring officc wherc custonicr bills wcrc gencratcd.
T h e s a m e basic principlcs for charging for t h e use of tclccommunications nctworks are in place today. The tclcphonc cxchangcs havc cvolvcd into complex digital switching systems totally controlled by softwarc. Whcn a subscriber placcs a call thc local exchange automatically crcatcs a rccord o f thc call dctails (21, H process known a s rrutomrrtic messrige rrccorinting (AMA) or toll ticketiug (TT). The CDRs arc storcd in ii filc at thc local cxchangc and periodically scnt t o a ccntralizcd billing systcm, usually at another location. This offlinc procedure can vary from physically transporting magnetic tapes to transmitting thc records across a data network. If the records arc transferred immediately, the process is known as hot billing or online charging. This allows bills to be processed on request or within a given time limit. However, it is not yet in widespread use among operators.
Billing software extracts information from the C D R s and c a l c u l a t e s the cost of the c a l l for the customer by applying price rate tables based on called distance, call duration, time of day the call was placed, and subscriber type (residential or business). Every billing period a bill, possibly detailing the calls placed, is sent to the customer for payment. The billing lifecycle is summarized in Fig. 1 .
T h e contents of a C D R vary from operator to operator. This is partly due to their use not only for billing, but also for t h e measurement of traffic and quality of service. Switch architectures from different manufacturers also produce information in different formats. Recent standards for call records do exist [3-71, but are not yet widely adhered to. However, there are some critical fields for billing, usually present in some form. These are listed below.
Service lriforrriatiori -Tlic type o l call service uscd. such as basic call, prcmium ratc. toll frcc. co n fe rc lice cii I I, o I o t 11 c r s ti pp le m c n t ii ry scrv i ccs. 1 t niay also include the quality of sci-vice (QoS) providcd. sucli as use of ii low-dclay optic libcr l i n k instead of a slower satellite connection.
Charging and p r i c i 11 g inform a t i o n is LI s U a I I y applicd whcn the records reach tlie billing system. Tlic size of a C D R can range from 20 bytcs to several hundred bytes, hut for pcrforniance efficicncy i t should be kept to a minimum. I f ii call is not answered, a C D R may still bc crcated, although the
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Bulk upload new records elecommunications customer will not b e hilled f o r tlicsc. Sometimes two or more records are created for the same call, an originating record and a tcrminating o r trunk record. This is uscful when all the necessary information is not availablc at o n e placc in thc network.
The only proof that a call took placc is the CDR, and sophisticated duplication schemes are used to ensure that this data is not lost. The raw data generated by tlic switch is also kept for the purposc of settling disputes. Howevcr, there is no mechanism in place to prove the authenticity of the data. The call records can be denied by the customer or falsified by tlie operator.
Billing in Mobile Networks
Rapid growth in mobile communications has given rise to a largc number of indcpcndent network operators, spanning many different geographic arcas and countries. When these operators use a common mobile standard, it is possible to allow subscrihcrs to roam from the home network to a visited location, choosing bctwecn the new operators availablc. The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) [SI, with over 350 network operators worldwide, provides more than 215 million customers with the ability t o make and receivc calls when outside tlicir home network. In order to coordinate the initial deploymcnt of tlie GSM standard, 15 mobile network opcrators signed a memorandum of understanding ( M o U ) committing to introduce GSM systems by 199 1. This early iigrccnicnt has evolved into an international association of GSM network operators, the GSM Association 191. Its purpose is to guide thc conimercial development of GSM, while working alongside the technical standards bodies such as tlic European Telcconiniuiiications Standards lnstitu te (ETSI).
Billing and accounting procedures arising from international roaming are regulated by the GSM Association. It states that charges made to ;I roaming subscriber in ii visited network must be collected by his home operator with whom lie has a subscriber agrccnient [ 101. When tlic visitcd network operator providcs services to tlie subscriber, they need to be assured that the subscriber's liomc nctwork will cornpensatc them for tlic charges incurred. A mobile user has no contract o r relationship with the visited operator. For this reason roaining is o n l y pcrmittcd hctwccn networks which have iirrii ngcd a hikiterul t.ouiiiiizg ~gree/iie/it. The GSM Association Billing Administration and Roaming Group (BARG) lix laid down the rcgulatiow applicable to such roaming agrccmcnts.
Tlic visited network operator providcs sei-vices to roamers wit 110 ti t t 11 c need lo I' addition ii I s U bsc r i h e r c o n t !-act s o r crcd i t a u t 11 o r i z a t i o n s. To ens II rc that t 1 1 c s ti hsc r i he r is gc n U i n c , liis/her home location register ( H L R ) is contacted. Autlicntication is performed hascd on the knowledge of a shared secret hctwcen thc HLR and sulxcrihcr. Upon ii valid idcntification t h e subscriber can makc and rcccivc a s many calls ;IS R Figure 1 . The billing cycle it1 existbig telecoriiriiiinicatiorls networks dcsired through the visited mobile network. CDRs are gcncratcd by the visitcd network and later forwarded in bulk to the home operator for settlement. The network operators scttle payment for the resources used between thcmselves, and the charge is ultimately rcflectcd in tlie user's bill.
The Transfcrrcd Account Procedure (TAP) [ I 11 dctails how the CDRs of roamers should be transferred from the visited network back to the home network. The file formats and transfer methods between operators are specified by the GSM Transfcr Account Data Interchange Group (TADIG). Elcctronic Data Interchange (EDI) is used to exchange the T A P files in a standard message format. This is often performed using file transfer over an X.25 network.
Mobile nctworks not based on GSM technology use procedures othcr than the GSM TAP to transfer the call records of roaming sub sc r i 13 e r s. T h e C e I I u 1 a r In t e rca r r i e r B i I I i n g Exchangc Record ( C I B E R ) [ 121 is used for roamer billing throughout North and South America. CDRs of roamers are converted into the C I B E R format before being cxchanged. The CIBER standard is published by Cibcrnet, a provider of financial settlement services for wireless operators.
Multiple CDRs, or toll tickets, can be generated for diffcrent legs of a GSM call. These include the originating, tcrniinating, and roaming call components. In a mobile-originated call the calling party usually pays for all stages. When a roaming mobile is called, the subscriber pays for the componcnt of thc call from the HLR to his location in the visitcd network. With optimal routing [ 131, whcre calls arc routed directly instead of via the home network, the roaming component can he niinimizcd. Figure 2 shows mobilc subscriber A, in his honie network, calling a roaming subscriber B. A will hc billcd for the originating leg (TTl): while B will bc billcd for the roaming leg (TT2) and terminating leg (TT3).
There arc 52 different fields within a GSM toll ticket 131. Tlic Intcrnational Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) identifies the source of a mobile-originated call. In addition to regular C D R fields tlic toll tickct contains location arca, ccll ID, intcrnational mobile equipment identity (IMEI), and radio channcl allocation.
The roaming agreement is used to cstablish trust betwccn independcnt operators. Howevcr, thcrc is no guarantcc o f iocontestablc charging o r payment for any of tlic partics involved. I n addition, each network operator niay have to exchange CDRs and payment with up to scvcral hundred othcr network operators. Such dircct reconciliation is both costly and inefficient. In order t o minimize thc number o f transactions, and hence the cost of settlcment, ii central clearinghouse o r brokcr can hc uscd. In the absence of hot billing, fraudulent calls m a y last tor hours or cvcn days bcforc they are detcctcd when tlic toll tickct is finally clcarcd. To rcducc such fraud sonic opcr:itors will tcrminatc all calls that exceed a spccific timc limit. Other problems such as privacy issues also exist. Use of CDRs results in databases being kept with details of the location and duration of every call a user makes or receives.
Retail and Wholesale Rates
The fixed network is based on a dual price system. For each call the user is charged a retail price, called the collection rate, by the originating network operator. In turn, the originating network operator is charged a reduced wholesale price by the terminating operator for completing the call connection. For a domestic interconnection between two operators within the same country, this wholesale price is known as a termination charge and is based on the cost of delivering the call to the final destination within the termination network. Thus, the charge may differ depending on what part-of the network the call is going to or what resources are used.
The current situation with international interconnection works differently. The originating and terminating international operators agree on a wholesale price, called the accounting rate [14] , for delivering traffic over their part of the intcrnational link. Traffic usage of the link is recorded; if there is an imbalance in the volume of incoming and outgoing traffic, the originating operator which generates more traffic pays the difference, called the net settlement payment, to compensate the terminating operator. The sertlernent rate is usually half of the accounting rate, which assumes that thc cost of terminating the call is the same for each partner.
The accounting rate system has come under criticism and is currently being reformed. It was originally designed for an industry structure based on national monopoly providers and is biased against countries which send more calls than they receive. International calls to mobile networks introduce further problems. The settlement rate is set on the basis of fixed network termination costs. If the international call must be routed into a mobile network, with an additional domestic termination charge, the settlement rate may not be high enough to cover this charge as well as the costs incurred by use of thc international facilities. Hence, one or morc of the operators involved could conceivably lose money. For both domestic and international interconnection thc seconds of traffic terminated for each call are recorded in CDRs. Thesc are added up at the end of the billing period and charged at thc wholesale price to thc originating operator. The GSM Association have introduccd a wholesale tariff between GSM operators for roaming services, called the I n t e r -O p e r a t o r Tariff ( I O T ) . Previously r o a m e r s wcre charged the retail tariff of the visited network, which could change significantly with currency fluctuations. GSM opcrators continue to bill each othcr based on C D R s cxchangcd using TAP. cost of collecting the coins, and counterfeit fraud led to the development of card-operated payphones. Prepaid cards, usually based on memory cards or smart card technology, are purchased from a distributor. As the card is used its value is decremented locally, oftcn in response to toll pulses sent from the exchange. Therc is no need to verify the card online with a central database, as is the case when credit cards are used in payment.
Calling cards offer a temporary account with a network operator against which calls can be made. Such accounts can be prepaid or credit-based. In the former case the account status nceds to be monitored and the call terminated in rcal time when the value is used up. International discount calling services are similarly account-based. They allow the use of a n alternative network, and its reduced tariffs, by connecting to a user and presenting them with call-out services from that alternative fixed network.
Prepayment becomes more complicated in mobile nctworks because it is still desirable to be able to receive calls and roam internationally using many different network operators. The majority of prepaid mobile solutions are based on temporary accounts maintained at the HLR. Ericsson 1151 is one supplier of such solutions in Europe. Its range of GSM prepaid solutions a r e intelligent-network-based with hot billing to allow automatic call termination when the account value reaches zero. While many network operators now offer such services, only a handful allow prepaid international roaming. The solutions are ad hoc and are often priced to cover the highest possible tariffs in a visited network rather than the actual onc in placc. Some systems require a credit card against which to bill roaming chargcs, another uses a flat-rate call back servicc through the home network, and another requircs that the GSM short message service (SMS) bc used to send thc desired number to the home network for call completion. Each solution usually has a substantial initial charge to cover costs of registering and maintaining identities in the HLR: making it infeasible for use by a casual visitor. Thcrc is clearly a need for improved solutions and agreement betwecn operators to allow prepaid roaming in mobile networks.
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Proposed Future Systems
In future mobile systcnis it is envisaged that thcrc will hc 21 large number of separately administered acccss networks, each with connections to onc or more fixed networks. ThrouSIi these uscrs will be ablc to access a largc varicty o f online services provided by a n even larger number o f compctiiig val~ie-arlded service providers (VASPs). Within any onc rcgioii thcrc might bc hundreds of indcpendcnt nctwork opcrators, giving iiccess to information and scrviccs provided by both local and remote VASPs. The current billing and payment mechanisms outlined earlier, with implicit trust relationships between parties, will no longer be suitable in this scenario.
In Europe the name given to the future third-generation system is the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System ( U M T S ) [16] . T h e A d v a n c e d Security for Personal C o m m u n i c a t i o n s Technologies (ASPECT) project [17] was a threeyear A d v a n c e d C o m m u n i c a t i o n s Technologies and Services (ACTS) project which investigated secure billing f o r U M T S applications, a m o n g o t h e r security features. A S P E C T demonstrated a n incontestable charging p r o c e d u r e , designed t o allow small payments for value-added services [l8, 191. T h e A S P E C T approach was t o break a call into two chargeable components. The first component was the basic charge for bearer services, the transport of call data, provided by the network operator. This is handled using traditional billing. T h e second chargeable component was the premium rate charge for use of services provided by a VASP. T h e ASPECT solution allows the mobile user to make many small payments directly to the VASP as the services are provided. The scheme is outlined in Fig. 3 . Each payment token can only be generated by the user and is proof that he agrees to pay the VASP a small fixed amount. At the end of the day the VASP forwards t h e payment proof to t h e user's U M T S service provider, who then bills the user in the traditional fashion. A S P E C T improves o n c u r r e n t solutions by providing incontestable charging for premium rate services, guaranteeing that t h e bill from a VASP is genuine. However, it still does not address network operator billing; nor does it guarantee payment from the user. T h e A S P E C T project was completed in 1998, and a new A C T S project entitled U M T S Security Architecture (USECA) started. It is defining a complete U M T S security framework for standardization. I n December 1998 an international consortium of telecommunications standards bodies, known as t h e Third Generation Partnership Project (SGPP), was formed to produce technical specifications for a third-generation mobile system. Both 3GPP and t h e G S M Association a r e also considering t h e requirements for charging and billing, based on C D R s , in third-generation systems [20, 211. 
Micropayment Technology
In order to prevent fraud there is a need to be able to pay in real time for telecommunications services. Traditional billing allows t h e total a m o u n t to b e paid afterward, but cannot ensure payment or provide incontestable charging. The entire amount cannot be paid in advance since the duration of the call or quantity of scrvices used is not usually known beforehand. Many of the prepaid solutions discusscd earlier work on the principle of making several small payments throughout a call. For example, this might involve depositing coins into a payphone or deducting units from a prepaid card at regular intervals. However, these methods only allow a single specific network operator to be paid. With mobile communications a roaming user is likely to use many different network operators and VASPs. It is desirable to be able to make efficient repeated payments of small amounts, called micropaynzents, to all the parties involved in a call as the services are used.
Many methods for electronically paying for serviccs or goods across a network have been proposed [22] . They include the secure use of credit cards, electronic checks, digital cash, and subscription-based services. Each of these macropayment instruments have a minimum transaction overhead, usually imposed by the issuing bank, which prevents them being used for payments of a few cents. This is especially true of credit cards and electronic checks. A second prohibiting factor is their heavy use of computationally expensive cryptographic operations, such as public key cryptography. Digital cash systems, which try to mimic some of the properties of real cash, usually employ some form of digital signature technology for every transaction. For example each electronic coin might be signed by the issuing bank, or signatures might be used for mutual authentication between parties. These factors make macropayments too inefficient for frequently repeated transactions such as making a payment per second for a telephone call. In contrast, micropayment solutions are designed to allow efficient transfer of very small amounts, perhaps less than a penny, in a single transaction.
Micropayments allow new opportunities for charging, not only for basic transport services but especially for premium rate services and value-added information. Mobile uscrs might pay t o receive weather information, view financial markct data, join a conference call, or listen to their voicemail. To be viable such a scheme must be able to perform a large nunibcr of transactions per second at a very small cost. This is attaincd by minimizing the following.
Communications Overhead -Macropayment schemes often establish a real-time connection to a third party for authorization during payment. In mobile billing such an online connection is established to the H L R as part of uscr authentication. A micropaymcnt should be o f h i e t o reducc communications time and cost. This increases the possibility of fraud; hence, the cost of committing such fraud should bc made greater than thc possible gain.
Computations Performed -In order to verify a payment efficiently, the number of computationally expensive opcrations needs to be minimized. Asymmetric (public key) cryp- tography, such as the RSA algorithm, is more compute-intensive than symmetric cryptography, which in turn requires more computation than hash functions such as MD5 and SHA [23] .
T h e exact speed differences will depend o n the algorithms and implementations. Typically, a hashing operation will operate four orders of magnitude faster than RSA signature gene r a t i o n a n d t h r e e o r d e r s of m a g n i t u d e f a s t e r t h a n R S A signature verification. Micropayment systems will maximize the use of computationally fast operations, such as hash functions, while eliminating any public key operations where possible. T h i s efficiency allows t h o u s a n d s of payments t o b e processed per second. Micropayment research has concentrated o n repeated payments to a single vendor, as in the ASPECT scheme. Many of these systems are based on the use of one-way hash functions to generate chains of hash values. Lamport originally used such hash chains for access control [24]. Pederson's "phone ticks" later used them to pay a single network operator for a phone call [25] , as part of the ESPRIT project CAFE [26] . The ASPECT payment scheme was also based on phone ticks. Further schemes which apply the use of hash chains to encode amounts for payment include PayWord [27] , Netcard [28] , iKP micropayments [29] , and PayTree [30] . The basic idea of these schemes is that a user generates a hash chain by repeatedly applying a hash function to a random value PN. The user commits to the hash chain by digitally signing a message containing the final hash value Po, and sends it to the vendor. For each micropayment the user releases the next payment hash, thepre-image of the c u r r e n t value, t o t h e v e n d o r . F o r t h e first payment P I is released, for the second payment Pz, and so on. Since the hash function is one-way, only the user could have generated this value, and knowledge of it can constitute proof of payment. Actual monetary value is claimed by redeeming the spent hash tokens, along with the commitment, at a broker with whom the user has an account. The process is illustrated in Fig. 4 .
Multiparty Payment in Real Time
With mobile communications a user might arrive in a new network, place calls which are routed through several independent networks, a n d use t h e services of both local a n d remote VASPs. Consider the scenario illustrated in Fig. 5. U p o n arrival in a new city, a mobile visitor places a call through t h e local mobile network o p e r a t o r t o V A S P l to obtain a city traffic report and directions to his hotel. He then calls an acquaintance, a n o t h e r mobile user located in t h e same network, to inform her of his arrival. Finally, he places a long distance call, which is routed through two independent networks, to the remote VASP3 who provides him with voicemail services. W e p r o p o s e two different solutions, e a c h employing micropayment technology, which allow all entities involved in these calls to be paid as they provide the services.
A call can be imagined as a linear connection of N entities. In the first solution t h e mobile pays the aggreg a t e d call c o s t f r o m all e n t i t i e s involved in the call to the local network o p e r a t o r ( N O ) . T h a t N O subtracts the amount it is d u e and pays t h e r e m a i n d e r t o t h e next e n t i t y downstream in t h e connection. T h e N O that receives this payment does t h e s a m e f o r its downstream entity a n d so o n until t h e final entity gets In the second solution the mobile uses the same payment token to pay all the entities at once. The mobile sends a payment token to the local NO, who forwards a copy to all the downstream entities. The payment token is worth a different amount to each entity, and this amount is fixed at call setup. Thus, NO1 could redeem the token for 2 cents, while N O 2 could redeem t h e same token for 3 cents. W e examine t h e details of each scheme in the following sections.
Protocol Goals
Both existing and proposed mobile billing systems have been outlined, and a vision of the architecture of future mobile networks has been presented. We now discuss the design goals of the multiparty payment solutions for these mobile networks. Particular attention is given to features which improve o n existing C D R billing a n d solve the problems these systems face in a large multi-operator environment.
Real-Time Payment
Anywhere -A mobile user should be able to pay all parties involved in a call in real time, regardless of his current location and without need for online contact with a distant HLR. By removing the need for subscriber billing, all of the associated costs imposed on network operat o r s a r e e l i m i n a t e d . Existing m o b i l e systems u s e s t r o n g authentication of users or equipment through a possibly distant home location. The purpose of this is for billing, location management for incoming calls, a n d key management for ciphering. Once the user pays in real time, the home location does not need to be involved. In regard to ciphering, encryption key e s t a b l i s h m e n t c a n t a k e p l a c e using t h e service provider's public key. The need for subscription with a home operator can be completely removed if location management is treated as one of many services provided by VASPs.
Remove User Trust and Accountability -T h e number of mobile users is far greater than the number of VASPs, which in turn are more numerous than NOS. Therefore, the users should be the least trusted entities within the system. Existing credit-based mobile billing systems trust the user to pay hisher bill, based on initial strong identity verification, credit history checks, and strong online authentication at the start of a session. Unlimited credit with post-fact punishment is too open to abuse in a large global system. Extensive blacklists of stolen identities and equipment must b e maintained to curb fraud and credit abuse. With so many mobile users it is desirable to remove the need to trust them, and thereby minimize fraud.
No User Signatures and Certificates -Mobile users arc the lcast trusted entities in thc system due to thcir numbers. While one can have some faith in a digitally signed document from an NO, a digital signature from a random roaming user, of which there can be many millions, is of less value. USC of signaturcs implies the existence of a public key infrastructure (PKI) capable of handling several hundred million certificates, assuming only one certificate per user. This is a huge task, especially considering that certificates will need to be revoked and the validity of a certificate checked by each party wishing to verify a user's digital sig- 
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of independent entities can be used, the use of user digital signatures, with revocation checks, as a guarantee of payment will not be efficient or scalable. Also, current mobile devices, such as GSM SIMs, are not yet capable of generating public key digital signatures. In order to improve scalability and remove the need to trust the user for payment, user digital signatures and certificates are not used within the system. This has the added advantage of affording the user more privacy.
Prevent lnteroperator fraud -Current C D R billing is based on trust and does not provide nonrepudiation. A network operator can forge CDRs. A mobile user can also deny making a call and hence refuse to pay the bill. With a large n u m b e r of NOS a n d VASPs t h e possibility of any fraud between these entities needs to be removed.
Minimize Roaming Agreements -Currently operators must have roaming agreements with a foreign network in order for one of their subscribers to be able to roam into and place calls from that nctwork. This can result in a large number of bilatcral roaming agreements. Such agreements should not be necessary to allow mobile roamers to make calls in whatever network they find themselves using.
Dynamic Charging -Both NOS and VASPs should be able to dynamically price their services on a per-call basis. Tariffs can then be adjustcd depending on current network conditions and quality requestcd, among other factors. Current VASPs are restricted by the NO'S pricing model. Dynamic tariffs will allow a larger variety of scrvices to be provided with different charging models.
Payment flexibility -Current payphone solutions require the appropriate coins or prepaid cards to be able to pay the local NO for thc call. Our second solution overcomes this by allowing a call to be paid for using tokens specific to any entity that appears in thc call route.
Offline faynierft Verification -Any entity accepting paymcnt should be able to cfficicntly vcrify its validity offline, without need to contact a third party. Each payee should be guarantccd to be able to redcein a valid token with a broker.
Multiple Brokers -A paymcnt token should be redeemable and verifiable at any broker who trusts thc issuing broker. It should not be possible to spend the same paymcnt token twiec o r for a single payee t o redeem the same token with more than a single broker.
ldentified Payeels) -A payment token should only be redeemable by specific identified payee(s). This is to prevent tokens being stolen by eavesdroppers and cheating entities.
Token Portability -The tokens can be stored on a smart card. This allows them t o be used in any mobile (or fixed) device either owned by the user, rented, or shared. A multiapplication smart card would allow a macropayment instrument such as electronic cash o r a credit card scheme to be carried o n the same card and used t o buy payment chains online from a broker. In summary, we wish to remove unnecessary trust from the system, reduce the online communications overhead of contacting a home location, and allow real-time payment anywhere by anyone who holds valid payment tokens.
Solution 7: Each Party Pays the

Service Provider owns stream
Payment Chain Purchase from a Broker -A mobile user buys prepaid value, through their phone or terminal, from an online broker. T h e purpose of the broker is to aggregate micropayments between entities. To facilitate the purchase we envisage the broker being reachable through a toll-free number. A macropayment scheme such as a credit card o r electronic cash is used to make the purchase. The payment chain purchase protocol is shown in Fig. 6 . The mobile user creates the actual payment hash chain by repeatedly applying a oneway hash function, such as the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), to a root value Px. The payment chain will be spendable at a specific service provider, called the enforcer, nominated by the user. The chain has no monetary value until committed to by a broker. To obtain this commitment the mobile user makcs a macropayment to the broker, sending along the final hash (Po), the chain length (X), the desired total value of the chain, and the identity of the enforcer through whom it must bc spent, all encrypted with the broker's public key. It is assumed that the user has securely obtained and verified the brokcr's public key certificate beforehand. T h e root hash (Px) from which the rest of the chain can be generated never lcaves thc mobile during the chain purchase phase.
T h e broker commits t o the hash chain, o r promiscs to honor its value, by digitally signing the paynzenr chain comrnrt- ,)) , consisting of the chain dctails scnt by tlie mobilc user. The comniitmcnt shows that each p q w i e / i f /rash vuhre from thc chain represents a prcpaid valuc rcdccmablc at the broker. Each payment hash is worth tlic same amount, that is, the total chain value divided by the chain length. The commitment is returncd to the uscr. If tlic mobile device is not capable of public kcy cryptography, a shared symmetric session key can bc used to protect tlic macropayment details ovcr thc air interface, as with GSM devices. Tlie signaturc on the commitment is vcrificd by tlie payecs at call sctup, and will h e rejected if invalid. This offers somc security to a mobile device with no public key signature verification capabilities.
Paynicnt Iiaslies a r e rclcascd scquentially to tlic servicc provider as payment throughout a call. By fixing thc enforcer in the commitment, the mobile cannot spend payment hashcs morc than once by attempting to doiihle spericl at other providers.
Assenibling a Pricing Contract -To place a call the uscr sends t h e call details, such as destination, call type, QoS requiremcnts, and payment chain Commitment to tlie nominated service providcr lic is about to use. A signcd prl'cing cotitrucI is then generated by the service providers involvcd in thc call. The pricing contract has two purposes. First, it allows dynamic tariffs and different charging schemes which can bc verified by the mobile user. Second, it is used to exchange payment chain commitments and to fix the starting hash for the call.
A call tariff may vary according to tlie service requcsted, current network load, and time of day, among other things. T h e pricing contract dcscribcs tlic tariff ratc and charging mcclianism (e.g., per sccond or data unit, QoS typc) cach SP will apply for providing their part of the service requested by tlic uscr. Since tlie pricing contract is signed by cach SP, thc mobile user can be assured that the tariffs are genuine and have not b e e n inflated by t h e enforcer SP. Figure 7 shows t h e three-way handshake protocol used to construct the pricing contract. In the first step cach SP involvcd adds a linc to tlie pricing contract. Each line consists of tlic following fields, a s shown in Fig. 8: T r a nsac t ion i d e ti t i f i cr, locn I I y unique to tlic SP. By combining tlic local transaction IDS and tlic SP identifiers, a unique idcntificr for tlic contract is obtained. Servicc providcr idcntity. Charging nicchanism (e.g.. durat i o n , volume o f data) and corrcsponding tariff ratc for tlic SP. I'aymcnt chain coniniitmcnt, signcd by II hrokci-, spcndahle o n l y at this SI', thc cnforccr.
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( P S l a , l x ) a n d its position i n t h e chain, along with tlie partially colistructcd contract. Each entity will iisc a dilferetif payrmri/ chrri/i to pay the downstream entity. For example, i n Fig. 9 thc mobilc uscr pays SPl using payment hash chain P, whilc SPI pays SP2 using payment chain Q, and SP2 pays SP3 using payment chain R . O n c e constructed, t h e full c o n t r a c t is digitally signcd by the service providcrs to prevent any fields being c ha ngcd.
By including the commitments in the contract, spcnt payment hashes can be associatcd with a specific call. This crea t e s a record of tlie call. providing much of t h e s a m e information obtainable from a traditional CDR. When a pricing contract is associatcd with spent payment hashes the call duration, call routc, and call destination can be obtained. Likc rcgiilar CDRs, this will allow it to be used for many secondary functions such as intrusion detection, network planning, markcting data collection, and law enforcement. If desirable and depending on the macropayment system used, the idcntity of a mobile user can bc associated with a payment chain commitment whcn purchased at tlic brokcr. This would allow the callcr's identity to also bc associated with the call. If user anonymity is required, the payment chain must be purchased using an anonymous macropayment systcm like some forms of electronic cash.
I n step two cach SP digitally signs the fully assemblcd pricing contract, checking that their line has not been altered in any way. The signing starts with the final SP in the call route, who passcs the partially signed contract back along the route to SP1. In an implementation cach SP will sign a hash of tlic contract. Tlie signatures prove that cach SP took part in the call and is due paymcnt.
Aftcr SP1 has signed, the finishcd contract is forwarded to cach SP in step tlircc. Thcrc is no nccd for SPs to trust cach otlicr sincc each can independently verify tlic fully signed con- tract. The pricing contract is presented to the user for agreement before the call is set up. From the charging information fields the total call cost per charging unit is obtained. The user can verify the signatures to prove that each quote is genuine. If necessary, t h e public key certificates for t h e service providers a r e distributed to each o t h e r and the mobile in s t e p s two a n d t h r e e . A service provider's c e r t i f i c a t e is required in order to verify a digital signature from that service provider. In a mobile device with limited computational capability, the signature verification can be omitted as long as the user is prepared to pay the price quoted. To detect overcharging by SPI, the validity of the pricing contract can be checked later on another device or with a broker. A new contract may be established midcall t o reflect any changes in tariff. For example, this might occur if a long call overlaps the switch from peak rate to off-peak rates. Similarly, if an interoperator handover occurs during a call, a new pricing contract is established as part of the call setup with the new operator.
Making Payments -The user pays the total charge from all service providers to the first service provider in the call. That service provider subtracts the amount it is owed and in turn pays the downstream entity the remaining amount. Having agreed to t h e pricing contract, t h e user begins t h e call by releasing a payment hash worth the total amount d u e per charging unit. For example, in Fig. 9 SP1, SP2, and SP3 might charge 2, 2, and 1 cent(s) per unit, respectively, for the call, yielding a total charge of 5 cents. If Commp represents a new payment chain with hash values worth 1 cent, Pg, the fifth hash in the chain is sent to SPl. SP1 applies the hash function five times repeatedly to this payment hash, and if the payment is valid the result will be the final hash Po. The value of a payment hash is fixed in the broker commitment. Sending P5 a f t e r Po is equivalent to sending all five payment hashes, P,-Ps, since they c a n b e obtained from Ps by repeatedly hashing. In turn, SPl pays SP2 using payment hashes worth 1 cent from t h e chain defined by CommQ. SPl pays SP2 the remaining 3 cents by sending Q3,. SP2 applies three repeated hash functions to Qi to obtain Qo, proving the payment is valid.
T h e flow of payment continues downstream until thc last SP is paid. Payment is origoitig, with t h c user rclcasing hashes at regular intervals according t o thc charging nicchanism. For a voicc call this might be every second. I n rcturn for a valid paymcnt, the SPs continue to provide the service they agreed to in thc pricing contract. If thc user does not reccivc these serreleasing any more payment hashes. In Fig. 9 , N is the number of payments made. When paying another SP downstream, the payer may use payment hashes from a different broker than the upstream entity.
Redeeminq Tokens -At the end of the day the SP '"1 sends the pricing contract, the highest spent paymcnt hash, and t h e position of that hash from t h e final hash (PO) in the chain to the broker: {Contract, Py, Y}Sigsp A broker will only redeem payment from the SP identified in the commitment, with a matching pricing contract. This prevents unauthorized parties from redeeming stolen payment hashes.
The broker verifies that the payment is valid by performing Y hashes on Py and comparing the result with Po in the commitment. He validates his signature on the commitment and checks his records to see that this part of the chain has not already been redeemed by the SP. To limit the state that must be held, certificates can expire after several months, with payment chains only being valid while the certificate is valid.
After verifying that the chain is valid, the broker pays the service provider the total amount redeemed. Any unspent payment hashes from the chain can be spent later through the same SP. It is up to the SP to remember the last spent hash from the chain, to prevent double spending of used payment hashes. A new pricing contract is established with the original commitment and the last spent hash as the new starting one. Figure 9 shows that SP2 starts to pay SP3 with an unspent hash Rzl from a partly used chain with commitment CommR. T h e user and SP1 start with hashes Ps and Q3, respectively, both from new chains.
A later section describes how an extra field can be added t o t h e pricing c o n t r a c t so t h a t payment h a s h e s may b e redeemed indirectly through any broker. A mobile user might roam out of an NO'S coverage area before all the value in a chain has been spent. To allow unspent value from a payment chain to be claimed back from the broker, the chain can be given an expiry date. Payment hashes which have not been spent or redeemed before this time can be exchanged for new value by the user upon presentation of the commitment and highest payment hash. Discussion -The first solution applics payment haslics on a link-to-link basis with each entity paying thc downstrcnm cntity the total remaining call cost. A pricing contract is introduccd t o allow verifiable dynamic tariffs, fix the starting hash for each payment commitmcnt and to crcatc an undcniablc record of the call. These advantagcs comc at an additional computational cost pcr call over traditional CDRs. Thc cost is:
1 signaturciSP at call setup for the pricing contract 1 signature vcrification/SP on thc payment commitnicnt N * ( A / V ) hash functions/SP to vcrify payment, whcrc A is the amount duc per charging unit, Vis thc valuc per payment hash in the chain being used, and N is the number of payments made x signature verifications o n t h e pricing contract by t h e mobile and optionally each SP, whcrc x is the number of SPs in the call 1 database lookup/SP if a partly spent chain is to be used, to ensure that the starting hash is equal to the highest spent hash from the chain However, of these only the computationally efficient hashing functions a r e used during the call. T h e mobile, broker, and SPs will also have additional offline computational costs of buying and redeeming paymcnt chains. The computational overhead is far less than in existing macropayment systems. The computational and communications cost of online authentication through a remote home location is removed. Existing C P U speeds and cryptographic accelerators are capable of handling the load for thousands of simultaneous calls. W e believe the advantages gained are worth this additional computational cost.
The solution achieves all the protocol goals describcd earlier, except payment flexibility. In particular, the advantages o v e r traditional C D R s in a mobile environment a r e t h e removal of trust between the user and SP, and also between the SPs themselves. Each SP is guaranteed payment, and thc user is guaranteed to only have to pay the tariffs prescnted at call setup. With traditional mobile billing the exact cost of the call is not presented to the user beforehand. T h e need for user authentication, online contact with a home location, and roaming agreements is eliminated. Additionally, the functions of traditional CDRs, other than billing, are not lost. The hroker and SPs can indcpcndcntly obtain a rccord of thc call from thc pricing contract and highest spcnt paymcnt hash.
Solution 2: Mobile Poys All SPs Directly
The main disadvantage of the first solution is that the local cellular NO through whom the call is to be placcd must hc known i n advance. If the mobilc user roams away from this NO hc will havc to buy a new paymcnt chain for usc with thc ncw NO.
Our sccond solution solvcs this problem by allowing thc saiiie payment liasli to be spent at all SPs participating in the call at the same time. When thc user purchases a paymcnt chain, she must still nominate an enforcer through whom to spend it, but this can be ariy network operator or VASP in the call route. For example, a user might pay a VASP to provide her with voicemail facilities. She buys a payment chain to spend at thc voicemail provider. Now, whenever s h e roams and whichever networks she uses to access her voicemail, she can use that chain to pay not only the voicemail VASP hut also all the NOS through which she is connecting.
If a call is being made to a party other than thc voicemail provider, the same payment chain should not be used. Instead, a different payment chain specific to one of the SPs involved in the call route will be employed. This prevents a geographically distant SP, not found in the route of the current call, being unnecessarily involved. A mobile user might typically carry several payment chains at once. Each chain would be specific to an SP through whom or to whom she frequently places calls. As long as the SP is present in the route of the active call, the chain can be used to pay all SPs involved in that call.
T h c protocol used to purchase a broker-signed commitment to a user generated payment chain is identical to that uscd in the carlier solution. However, in the first solution the value of each payment hash in the chain was fixed to be equal to the total chain value divided by the chain length. In the second solution the monetary value of a single payment hash is not fixed, allowing the same hash to be used to pay all parties, without the possibility of fraud. The enforcer will prevent more than the total value of the chain from being spent. Failure to do so will be detected by the broker when the hashes are redeemed. The chain length is still included in the commitment, so the enforcer does not set the hash value such that it requires more hashes than are in . .
Bearer and value-added services provided (user plane) t h e cLhain t o b e used t o spcnd the total valuc. Figures 10 and 11 show the same call being made, but with payment chains for different cnforccr SPs along t h e route. Figure 10 shows how t h e s c h e m e works w h e n t h e local NO is the enforcer. I n Pricirig Corifracf -I n thc sccond s o I uti o 11 t h c pricing co n t r act h a s m o r c significance. I n addition to providing thc original functions, it is also used to link a singlc paymcnt commitmcnt to multiplc SPs for a call. A problem arises whcn it payment hash may be redeemed by any party, as in the second solution. Parties who were not involved in a call and are not entitled to payment may try to redeem payment hashes. T h e pricing contract is used to identify those parties who may redeem payment hashes from a specific chain. An SP can only redeem a payment hash from a broker if it has a valid pricing contract which authorizes it to do so.
T h e pricing contract has a different structure in the second solution, as shown in Fig. 12 payment chain is present, the value of hashes from that chain are fixed in the contract, and an endorsement chain is present to prevent double spending of payment hashes.
The enforcer is responsible for ensuring that it is constructed correctly using the same three-way handshake protocol described earlier. As before, each SP signs the contract to prove that they took part in the call and are due payment. The enforcer signs the contract last. This prevents a partial contract being replayed t o trick another SP into accepting an old contract with an already spent hash chain. The enforcer knows which payment hashes have been spent, since they must pass through it, and it will not sign a contract with an already spent starting hash.
In Fig. 10 S P 1 signs t h e c o n t r a c t last, since it is t h e enforcer. However, when the pricing contract is bcing assembled for the sccnario in Fig. 1 I , the thrce-way handshake protocol will occur in the opposite direction, allowing the enforcer SP3 to sign thc contract last.
The total call cost per unit time, or per data unit transmitted, is the sum of each SP's tariff rate in the pricing contract. Assume for the moment that all SPs use the s a m c unit of measurement for which they must be paid. For example, this might be per second for a voice call or per kilobytc sent for ii data call. Each payment hash is worth the total cost per charging unit. This is best illustrated by example. Three SPs provide voice bearer scrviccs for a call charging 0. I , 0.5, a n d 0.2 cent/s, respectively. The cnforccr assigns each paymcnt hash to be worth 0.8 cent in thc pricing contract. Only ii single hash needs to he released every sccond, and this i s rcdccmablc by each SP. When the service providcrs redeem P40, the 40th payment hash, they will be paid 4, 20, and 8 cents. rcspectively. The broker knows how much to pay each SP from the eontents of the pricing contract. If the broker cannot trust the enforcer to assign value to payment hashes, it can be fixed in the broker commitment, as with the first solution.
Endorsement Chains, Double Spending, and ChangeThe enforcer, identified in the payment chain Commitment, is given the role of preventing double spending of payment hashes. Since all payment hashes must pass through t h e enforcer, it can keep a record of how much of the chain has already been spent.
After a call finishes, the mobile can reuse unspent hashes (thc change) on another call which may pass through different networks to a different dcstination than the previous call. During the call, the enforcer will ensure that the payment hashes it and t h e other SPs receive have not already been spent. However, without further protection mechanisms, cheating can take place after this call. For example, the user could give hashes spent in the second call to a different SP from the first call. Now both SPs from both calls have valid pricing contracts for the hashes, which they can redeem from the brokcr. Similarly, SPs from each call could collude to swap payment hashes to gain value in this way. While the broker can d e t e c t this fraud when t h e s a m c hash is l a t e r redeemed twice, he cannot be sure of who committed the fraud and thus who should not get paid.
T o solve this problem we introduce t h e concept of a n endorsement ch[iitz. This is a hash chain created and committed to by the enforcer for cach call. It consists of a final hash (Eo), chain length, and enforcer ID, a11 signed by the enforcer:
There is no value associated with an endorsement chain; its sole purpose is to prevent double spending. T h e enforcer's new endorsement commitment is included in each new pricing contract constructed. To make a payment the mobile user releases a single payment hash per charging unit. The enforcer applies a single hash function to verify it, and compares the result to the last received hash. If valid, the enforcer attaches a corresponding endorsement hash t o each payment hash before forwarding it to the other SPs, as shown in Figs 10 and 11. This endorsement hash indicates that the enforcer S P accepted the corresponding payment hash. An endorsement hash is specific to a call described by the pricing contract containing the endorsement and payment chain commitments.
To validate a payment each SP must verify the payment and endorsement hashes by recomputing the hash function on them. If both are valid, they will hash to the previous values received, or the commitment values in the case of the first payment.
The broker will now only accept a payment hash from an identified SP if a corresponding endorsement hash and pricing contract accompany it. In this way, double spending by the user and SPs other than the enforcer is prevented. As before, only the highest hash from both chains need be sent to the broker along with the pricing contract: Redeem = {Pricing-contract, Px, X, Ey, Y}Sigsp, where X and Y are the positions of the payment hash and endorsement hash, respectively in the hash chains specified by the commitments in the pricing contract. Double spending by the enforcer SP cannot be prevented since it is entrusted with generating the endorsement hashes. However, if the enforcer does cheat, it will be detected after the fact when other SPs redeem the same payment hashes twice. Post-fact detection is acceptable for the enforcer because the broker will refuse to issue payment chains in the name of enforcers it does not trust.
Broker Clearing -O n e disadvantage of the schemes, especially in the second solution, is t h e requirement that SPs redeem payment hashes from the issuing broker. For geographically dispersed SPs this will introduce a communication overhead, even when performed offline. To address this limitation, a network of brokers may be used whereby a payment chain may be redeemed at any broker agreed upon a t the time of call setup. When the pricing contract is constructed each SP fixes the redeeming broker, normally a local broker, with whom he is going to redeem the payment chain. This is an extra field per SP in the pricing contract:
BrokerA, SP2: BrokerB,
... SPN:
No other broker can now redeem the part of the chain spent during the call; hence, double redeeming is prevented. T h e redeeming broker later clears payment chains in bulk with the issuing broker. Existing financial clearing networks could be enhanced to exchange these details. O n e can envision a broker per area or region who will redeem for multiple SPs in that area.
Fraud is only possible when the enforcer signs multiple pricing contracts for the same part of a payment chain with different redeeming brokers for a n SP. T h e S P can then redeem the same chain from different brokers. If an enforccr cannot be trusted in this case, the issuing broker can nominate, in the payment commitment, a small number of brokcrs or even a single broker, as the redeeming brokcrs.
Discussion and Critique
Both solutions provide an efficient means of allowing real-time payment to multiple service providers with dynamic tariffing and variable charging schemes. Incontestable charging and guarantecd payment are provided without the need for user authentication o r online contact with a remote home location. A micropayment scheme using hash functions and offline broker contact allows the solutions to be efficient and scalable. To aid performance, digital signatures are only used at call setup to generate the pricing contract. Unlike traditional billing, the schemes allow fraud prevcntion to be decoupled from the clearing process.
The main disadvantage of each solution is that a service provider which will be involved in the call must be known in advance. In the first solution this must be the local SP, while the second solution is more flexible, allowing it to be any SP. However, payment chains are purchased online from a broker at any time, and this process can be seamlessly integrated with call setup. In addition, the requirement to use a specific SP is no different than current prepaid phone cards, calling cards, or discount calling services.
When comparing both solutions, the first offers the service providers more flexibility. A long payment chain between two SPs can be used for many calls. W h e r e two SPs trust each other, credit hashes can be used instead of prepaid ones. By establishing a pricing contract just between two SPs, a payment chain may be used to pay for multiple simultaneous calls between them. Solution one is also suitable for use in a migration scenario, where s o m e SPs still use traditional C D R billing. Instead of being paid or paying with hashes, a legacy SP will generate CDRs and bill other SPs.
The second solution allows the value of a payment hash to be fixed at call setup, and the same hash to be used to pay all SPs in the call. An enforcer is used to prevent double spending by issuing an endorsement hash for each payment hash. The computations necessary in solution two are the same as in the first solution, except for:
Two signature verifications per SP, one to verify the payment commitment, the other to verify the endorsement commitment. 2N hash functions per SP, where N is the number of payments made; one hash function for the payment, one for the endorsement. Additional signature by the enforcer on the cndorsenient chain. Endorsement chains can be generated in bulk at the beginning of the day. Thus, the number of hash functions performed during the call is lower, but each SP needs to perform an additional signature verification on the endorsement chain at call setup. For calls involving more than two SPs the size of the pricing contract will be smaller, due to fewer commitments being present.
Solution two provides more flexibility to the user by allowing any SP in the call t o act as a n enforcer to a payment chain. When a mobile user roams from one network to another, it is not necessary to purchase a new chain, provided the enforcer is prcsent in the call route. The same payment message from the enforcer is passed along through all other SPs, requiring no new message construction.
Enhancernerits arid Hybrids -Situations may arise where SPs in a call usc different charging mechanisms. For example, a VASP might charge based on data contcnt, whcrcas intermediate NOS might charge on the volume of data transmitted. In such a case a second payment chain can be used to pay the VASP, with the appropriate additional information being added to the pricing contract.
We have applied the solutions to reverse charging, split charging, and group charging sccnarios. Split charging refers to when the call cost is divided betwccn two parties, such a s when calling ;I roaming mobile uscr. A group call involvcs three or more cnd parties i n 21 branching nctwork topology. While we found that thc construction and negotiation of pricing contracts rcquircd extra effort, the actiial payment method remained largely unchangcd in each casc.
User-to-uscr payments a r c also possible provided tlic payee has a certificatc, allowing himiher to redeem payment hashes. Whilc special hardware is not required in our scheme, a smart card can bc used to sccurely store and transport payment chains if desired.
Implementation Status
A prototype has becn devcloped in Java using cryptographic libraries to supply certificate functionality, the RSA algorithm for digital signatures, and MD5 and SHA hash functions. Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) was used to handle mcssage passing across the network. NOMAD [31] , an application based on a popular Intcrnct tclephony package, was used to demonstrate payment with personal mobility for a voice call through multiplc scrvicc providers.
Con cl us ion
With a large number of network operators and value-added providers, it is nccessary to guarantee payment and remove the complex trust relationships involvcd in billing. Traditional billing methods for mobile systcms, based on the generation of a CDR, are examined. Based on these a number of problems are identified, especially in relation to future mobile nctworks with many scrvice providers. The desirable properties of a mobile payment system are drawn up, and two solutions which secui-ely achicvc these goals proposed. The additional computational cost of each solution ovcr traditional C D R generation was prescnted. Wc believe that thc small additional computation is an acceptablc cost for the fcatures. listed earlier, gained ovcr CDR billing.
To allow an efficient solution, with minimum computational cost during a call, a schcmc based on hash chains was used. Micropayment rescarch has conccntratcd on providing payment to a single vendor at any one time. We havc proposed a solution which allows micropaymcnts to multiplc vendors at the same time.
Dynamic tariffs and different charging schemes are possible by constructing a pricing contract at call sctup. We have eliminatcd the need for user certificates and authentication. This greatly reduces the number of public key ccrtificates needed in the system, and reduces the computational load for the user. In addition, it removes the need for contact with an HLR and provides a desirable level of anonymity and privacy. Migration using a niixturc of payment hashes and CDRs is possible. T h e solutions a r c also suitable for call services requiring split and group payment.
Our solutions provide an cfficient means of ensuring rcaltime payment in a multi-scrvicc-providcr environment without the need for user authentication. We expect the challenge o f mobilc paymcnt methods to grow dramatically in importance as mobile communications become increasingly sophisticated and ubiquitous.
